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Abstract
We investigate what it means to apply the solution, proposed to the
firewall paradox of [AMPS] by [HH], to the famous quantum paradoxes
of Schro¨dinger’s Cat and Wigner’s Friend if ones views these as posing
a thermodynamic decoding problem (as does Hawking radiation in
the firewall paradox). The implications might point to a relevance of
the firewall paradox for the axiomatic and set theoretic foundations
underlying mathematics. We reconsider in this context the results of
[Ben1976a] and [Ben1976b] on the foundational challenges posed by
the randomness postulate of quantum theory. A central point in our
discussion is that one can mathematically not naturally distinguish
between computational complexity (as central in [HH] and [Sus]) and
proof theoretic complexity (since they represent the same concept on
a Turing machine), with the latter being related to a finite bound on
Kolmogorov entropy (due to Chaitin incompleteness).
1 Introduction
The firewall paradox, originally posed in [AMPS], shows – under very general
assumptions – the incompatibilty of the unitarity requirement of quantum
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mechanics with the equivalence principle of general relativity even for weak
gravitational fields. The argument fundamentally rests on the idea that one
could use the Hawking radiation of a black hole to read information on the in-
terior from it, before falling in. It is the revolutinary achievement of [AMPS]
to show this to be actually possible in an intricate thought experiment. In
[HH] a possible solution to the paradox was proposed by showing that the
decoding of the Hawking radiation is a process of high computaional complex-
ity (in the sense of algorithmic information theory), in consequence taking
too long a time scale to be performed before the evaporation of the black
hole. The solution proposed in [HH] – and further pursued in [Sus] – can be
seen as trying to formulate the most conservative way out. For this reason
– since the alternative would be to accept a brakedown of physics, as known
so far, even for weak gravitational fields – it seems worthwile to stay with
this approach as long as possible. Since the proposal of [HH] fundamentally
rests on the complexity of decoding the Hawking radiation, one can pose the
question if paradoxes of this kind are really limited to the setting of gravita-
tion or if they point at a deeper conflict of quantum mechanics with complex
thermodynaic systems.
The famous quantum paradoxes of Schro¨dinger’s Cat and Wigner’s Friend
can also be seen as posing a decoding problem of a thermodynamic type (as
in the case of Hawking radiation). We investigate what it means to apply
the complexity theory based solution, as proposed to the firewall paradox of
[AMPS] by [HH], also to these situations. The implications might point to
a relevance of the firewall paradox for the very foundations of mathematics,
in the form of axiomatic systems and set theory. To deepen the perspective,
in subsequent sections we reconsider these implications from the viewpoint
of consequences which Chaitin incompleteness (see [CC] and [Cha]) has in
quantum theory, as well, as from the old results of [Ben1976a] and [Ben1976b]
on implications of the randomenss postulate of quamtum mechanics for the
set theoretic foundations of mathematics. In an appendix, we reconsider the
implications from a more physics based perspective.
2 Schro¨dinger’s Cat
The famous paradox of Schro¨dinger’s Cat is often viewed from a more or
less philisophical perspective as stressing the strangeness of the quantum
mechanical superposition principle, by bringing it to play on the notions of
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an alive or dead cat. Strange as the superposed state
|Ψ >= 1√
2
(|alive > +|dead >) (1)
is, it has the even stranger consequence that one can use it to bring dead
cats back to live. By the fundamental rules of quantum mechanics, there
exists a self-adjoint operator A having |Ψ > has an eigenvector. Starting
from the state |dead >, describing a dead cat, you can choose to measure the
obeservable A. The outcome is with probability 1
2
the state |Ψ > and with
probability 1
2
the state
|Φ >= 1√
2
(|alive > −|dead >) (2)
with the opposite superposition. But starting from the eigenstate |Ψ >
(and likewise for |Φ >), you can choose to measure (in this case by simply
having a look at it) if the cat is alive or dead. Once again, you will get the
result with probability 1
2
in each of the eigenvectors |alive > or |dead >. In
consequence, by performing these two measurements in succession, you have
a nonvanishing probability (1
2
, using both transitional states |Ψ > and |Φ >)
of starting from the state |dead > and ending up with the state |alive >,
bringing back the dead cat to life in this way. But the important point is
that this thought experiment is not just strange (which could equally well
just result from our prejudice with concepts as alive and dead, as resulting
from experience with classical instead of quantum objects, as it could point
to problems in our understanding of quantum mechanics) but has real physi-
cal content. The transition from life to death is – in prosaic terms of physics
– definitely a transition involving an increase in entropy (all the information
contained in neuronal activity and much more is lost). But the state |alive >
having lower entropy as the state |dead > means, by performing the two suc-
cessive measurements, as described above, you can at any time (since the
axioms of quantum mechanics presuppose that all self-adjoint operators are
available for measurement at any time) purposfully (nearly, i.e. with the – in
statistical mechanics terms rather high – probability 1
2
) decrease the entropy
of the physical system given by the cat.
You might argue against this conclusion by stating that one can not use a
desription of the system in terms of pure quantum mechanical states and as
a thermodynamic system at the same time since the latter relies e.g. on some
form of coarse graining and would on the quantum side have to correspond
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to a density matrix state. In other words, the reduction in entropy would
just result from removing the coarse graining on passing to a pure state de-
scription, i.e. the paradoxical conclusion would be just a kind of quantum
version of the Laplacian demon. I do not think this is a valid counter argu-
ment. What Schro¨dinger does in his thought experiment is starting from the
premise that we can in principle describe even the macroscopic system of the
cat in terms of a pure quantum mechanical system. Hence, the operator A
exists (which is the crucial step to apply the two successive measurements as
described above). The situation is rather different from classical mechanics
were passing to a many body description (and ultimately statistical ensem-
bles) does in no way interfer with the basic Hamiltonian structure (contact
transformations, etc.) of classical mechanics. In quantum mechanics the sit-
uation is different: Once we have accepted a quantum mechanical description
even for the whole macroscopic system, the superpositions and the operator
A are undeniably there by the very axioms of quantum mechanics. On the
other hand, the macroscopic system of the cat has the well known classical
description in terms of alive or dead which definitely has a thermodynamic
content in terms of emtropy. I strongly believe that Schro¨dinger is pointing
to exactly this point with his paradox.
To phrase the situation differently, imagine you decide to observe the situ-
ation of the cat together with a friend. What Schro¨dinger points to is that
your friend could decide to describe the cat as a completely quantum me-
chanical system, including the construction of the operator A. At the same
time, you could decide to consider the cat the way you have ever done. This
latter description includes the increase in entropy in the transition from alive
to dead cat. The paradox arises once you grant your friend the possibility
to describe – in principle – the complete macroscopic cat as a quantum me-
chanical system. You can not go on to later forbid your friend a single state
description by pointing to coarse graining as the origin of your own descrip-
tion because that would mean that systems which are described in essential
features by properties resulting from coarse graining do – even in principle
– not allow for a single state description. On the other hand, if you grant
your friend the single state description – as Schro¨dinger does – this does in
no way touch the fact that you will observe the cat as usual, including the
increase in entropy.
Now, let us suppose that a similar solution as proposed in [HH] for the fire-
wall paradox could also be pursued for the case of Schro¨dinger’s Cat. We
should strongly stress that we use this on the level of an assumption. Even
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if it would be applicable, it could still be a long way to rigorously prove such
an argument in the framework of complexity theory for a puerly quantum
mechanical system. The assumption is that – as in the case of decoding the
Hawking radiation – it would be a process of high computational complexity
– consequently taking a very long time – to actually realize the operator A.
Observe that constructing the operator A is similar to decoding thermal ra-
diation since it involves rereading the information of the alive cat from the
dead one (as the two stage experiment bringing it back to life shows since only
the measurement of A is involved, the final measurement basically consits of
just having a look at the cat). To make the analogy even more compelling we
could sligthtly modify the thought experiment by not putting the cat into a
box with a poison but observing it by astronomical techniques while the cat
is placed on another planet. There the radiation quantum would not simply
trigger the offset of a poison but the explosion of an atomic bomb. This does
not change the argument of the paradox at all but it shows that the state of
the dead cat would largely get the character of thermal radiation.
Let us further assume that – as in the solution to the firewall paradox pro-
posed in [HH] – it takes a time on the order of the recurrence time of the
system under consideration – so, in this case the cat – to construct the oper-
ator A. This looks immediately promising to resolve the paradox since it is
precisley the recurrence time under which the sytem is thermodynamically
allowed to reduce its entropy because it simply returns to its orginal micro-
scopic state by chance.
But we have to be careful at this point because one has to decide between the
classical Poincare recurrence time versus the quantum recurrence time of the
system. It is the quantum recurrence time which is the relevant one for the
system to return by chance to its original state and, hence, for the reduction
of entropy. Thermodynamics is not conistent with an underlying classical
theory as we know especially well for the case of radiation from Planck’s
historic discovery. It is the quantum recurrence time under which Hawking
radiation would by chance reensemble into a classical black hole (see [HH].
The recent discovery that mitochondria probably involve EPR quantum cor-
relations, in order to explain their high energy efficiency, further stresses that
we can not expect to read off the informtion of the alive cat without invoking
information from quantum correlated states, further stressing the quantum
recurrence time as the relevant one.
What about the complexity of A, i.e. the time it would take to construct
it in a quantum computation. If we keep to the analogy to [HH], this re-
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duces from the – exponentially larger – quantum recurrence time to classical
Poincare recurrence time, provided we can use the quantum circuit model for
the quantum computation which essentailly boils down to the requirement
that we can radiate away random information into a thermodynamic heat
reservoir. Can we grant this for the case of Schro¨dinger’s Cat? The answer
is yes because the needed heat reservoir is outside the system of the cat. The
situation is very much as in another famous thought experiment, known as
Wigner’s Friend. In this case, a person (Wigner’s Friend) is the observer for
the box with the cat. He is the one who performs the quantum computation
to construct the operator A and he is the one who has to have the means
of radiating away information into a thermodynamic resrvoir. As long as we
grant Wigner’s Friend to be a system described by classical phyiscs, this does
absolutely cause no problem.
But then we can not resolve the paradox of Schro¨dinger’s Cat. We can pass
from a more than exponential contradiction (between availability of A at
any time in quantum mechanics and the quantum recurrence time for the
sytem to reduce its entropy by chance) to an exponetial one (between classi-
cal Poincare and quantum recurrence time) but still a contradiction in terms
of a huge discrepancy of time scales remains. This would only be removed
if we would not grant Wigner’s Friend access to a thermodynamic reservoir
in which case the time he would need to complete the quantum computation
would also scale up to the quantum recurrence time. But this would mean,
we would treat Wigner’s Friend himself as a quantum mechanical sytem, in-
volving superpositions, etc..
Observe that the difference between the classical and the quantum de-
scription of Wigner’s Friend – resulting in classical Poincare versus quantum
recurrence as the time sacle for the quantum computation – is esentially a
difference in information available to this system at any time, as shown by
the crucial relevance of the possibility to radiate information away. We will
take a more detailed look on Wigner’s Friend in the subsequent section.
3 Wigner’s Friend
Should Wigner’s Friend itself be described as a quantum mechanical system
with superposed states? Here, the definite answer seems to be that this is not
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possible. It would mean that scientific results, the analysis of experiments,
publishing of papers about results, and all this, would live in a superposed
state until me personally coming into the lecture hall of some conference
venue and reducing everything to a classical description. We can not pass to
such a description because it would undermine one of the basic assumptions
behind science, putting all participants in the scientific enterprise on the
same footing and viewing outcomes of experiments as classical facts which
we can discuss as such in papers. Without a classical thermodynamic world
(involving the second law) there would be no notion of facts. Bohr always
stressed this necessity of a classical description of the final observer because
we have to be able to communicate results to and discuss them with col-
leagues.
It is the indeterminacy of quantum superpositions which leads us to requiring
a classical description for Wigner’s Friend. Though intuitively plausible, it
is not clear if this inderterminacy does agree with the difference in accessible
information for a classical versus a quantum computing system, as exem-
plified in the difference between classical Poincare and quantum recurrence
times. Even if one could show mutual implication for the case of conven-
tional nonrelativistic quantum mechanics, we do already know that there is
no agreement on the level of general principles from groundbreaking results
of [AW]. It is shown there that in the strange world of closed timelike curvers
(CTCs, for short) – involving some form of a consitency condition, of course,
since nobody should be able to kill his grandfather – the notions of classical
and quantum computability agree, i.e. there is no difference in accessible
information any more. More concretely, for both – classical and quantum
Turing machines – the very large complexity class PSPACE (which includes
and is believed to properly include the class NP) becomes accessible in poly-
nomial time.
In consequence, in such a world the requirement that Wigner’s Friend obeys
to a classical description without superpositions – in accordance with the
requirement of Bohr that results of experiments have to be communicable
in the community of scientists – would not lead to a contradiction in infor-
mation accessible to classical versus quantun systems and, therefore, not a
contradiction between computing times. The issue of classical Ponicare ver-
sus quantum recurrence time taken for the computation would be resolved.
A person using a mathematical description in accordance with the clas-
sical and quantum Turing machines of [AW] would see PSPACE as a class
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of polynomial computing time, i.e. in such a mathematical description we
would have
P = PSPACE (3)
Remember, here, that a different Turing machine just means a different
formulation of mathematics. In consequence, a different type of Turing ma-
chine requires a different – compatible with this notion of Turing machine –
formulation of set theory (as the foundational underpinning of mathematics),
an observation already made by John v. Neumann. In this case the solution
to the paradoxes would not be the conservative one, proposed for the firewall
paradox by [HH], but the conclusion would be that we are hindered in our
understanding of quantum theory and black holes/holography by the foun-
dations our present formulation of mathematics is build on (still this can be
seen as a conservative proposal compared to a brakedown of physics, as we
presently know it, even for weak gravitational fields). Let us explain this in
more detail.
A mathematical description, in accordance with the classical and quantum
Turing machies of [AW], requiring P = PSPACE leaves us with three pos-
sibilities: The first is that this holds anyway in our present foundations
of mathematics (given by the set theory ZFC or some mild modification
thereof). This is still possible but not the expectation held by most re-
searchers in the field. The second possibility is that the statement is actually
independent – as an example of Go¨del incompleteness – from the axiom sys-
tem ZFC. In this case, one could include (3) as an additional axiom, i.e. one
would be lead to an extension of set theory beyond the power of ZFC. The
third case (the one most experts in the field would expect) means that (3)
can actually be disproved from the axioms of ZFC. This would mean that we
could not get a new foundational set theory by simply passing to an extension
of ZFC, in order to incorporate (3), but that we would have to use a differ-
ent set theory altogether. The fact that this theory would have axioms in
contradiction with ZFC does not make it an absurdity. Of course, we would
have to require that large parts of our present day mathematics could be for-
mulated successfully also in this alternate system. From the side of physics,
one would, of course, have to require that e.g. the mathematical machinery
for general relativity, quantum mechanics, and quantum field theory would
still be available in this system. Though these are strong requirements, there
is no reason to assume a priori that they are impossible to meet.
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Let us take a short look at some examples from the realm of axiomatic set
theory which can serve to explain this view in more detail:
• The modern formulation of the concepts of calculus and the formula-
tion of Newton in terms of infinitesimals are rather different and for
a long time the infinitesimals have been just seen as an intuitive and
calculationally attractive approach, lacking logical consistency. As, is
well known, this is not true and the approach based on infinitesimals
can also be given a logically sound basis (this approach came to be
known under the name of nonstandard analysis). It is possible to com-
pletely avoid the model theoretic complications, involved in the first
approaches to this subject, and base nonstandard analysis completely
in an alternate axiomatic set theory (IST, for internal set theory, see
[Nel]), just as usual analysis is based in ZFC. So, mathematics and
physics can be done as usal – though with a different flavour – in
IST but IST and ZFC differ strongly in the deeper transfinite realm
(though IST is an extension of ZFC, i.e. they are not in contradiction
to each other). This example shows that large parts of mathematics
and the applications to mathematical phyiscs do not determine transfi-
nite structures to an extent which would make the foundational choice
of ZFC unique (There is a later formulation of nonstandard analysis in
terms of an alternate axiomatic set theory called BST – for bounded
set theory – which shows BST to be just a kind of language trick played
on ZFC, in this way removing the differences in transfinite structures
between IST and ZFC from the foundations of nonstandard analysis,
see [KR1995a]and [KR1995b]. Though this was an important step in
the foundations of nonstandard analysis, it does in no way affect the
use of the older IST approach as an example in our context, here.).
• Another example is offered by alternate set theories placed in the frame-
work of topos theory (see [Gol] for an introductory overview). These
using the intuitionistic propositional calculus of Heyting algebras – in-
stead of the usual Boolean algebra based propositional calculus – shows
another possible feature of alternate set theories: In search for alter-
nate foundations one has to take into account all three blocks of axioms
(the axioms of the set theory proper, the basic logical axioms, and the
inference rules) together and can not a priori limit the change to one
of the blocks.
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• Our final example shows that even if the requirement P = PSPACE
would turn out to establish a contradiction with axioms of ZFC used
in the foundation of e.g. general relativity or quantum mechanics, this
is not necessarily the end of the road. Kunen inconsitency is generally
viewed as an upper limit to the pyramid of large cardinals (cardinal
numbers beyond those for which the existence can be established using
only the axioms of ZFC; in this way large cardinals lead to a hierar-
chy of extensions of ZFC, see [Kan]). It can be shown that the road
to superlarge cardinals beyond Kunene inconsitency is open once one
accepts more fundamental changes in set theory, contradicting axioms
of ZFC (see [DGHJ]). Ulitmately only after reconsideration of all three
blocks of axioms jointly (see the previous item) can one decide what
is possible. An inconsistency first encountered, can lead to a different
approach for the system as a whole and there can still exist e.g. suit-
able formulations for the foundations of general relativity and quantum
mechanics in such an alternate system (The synthetic differential ge-
ometry inside certain topoi is also not the same as usual differential
geometry in strict axiomatic terms but it can still to a large extent
surve the same purpose).
We should observe at this point that even if the more conservative ap-
proach of [HH] turns out to be sucessful, we have actually a very similar
picture concerning the relation to the foundations of mathematics. In order
to work, the approach necessarily requires
P 6= NP (4)
to hold. The very same three possibilities as for the case of P = PSPACE
arise, here. The only difference is that most experts in the field believe (4) to
be derivable from the axioms of ZFC but this only means that the chances
for the three outcomes are weighted differently – if you make a poll amomg
experts – but this is the only difference, otherwise the situation is compeletly
the same.
Approaches to physics which are based on requirements such as P =
PSPACE or P 6= NP (if these requirements can not be derived from ZFC
or are even in contradiction to some of the ZFC axioms) mean that the
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deeper transcendental world of mathematics (beyond those concepts which
we use in most parts of mathematics or in the formulation of general rela-
tivity, quantum mechanics, gauge theory, etc.) would be shaped by physics
based requirements on the hierarchy of complexity classes.
This would from a logical perspective in no way be different from the way
in which counting shaped the most basic axioms of set theory (as we see
from the deep role played by Peano arithmetics – as exemplified e.g. in the
techniques behind the Go¨del incompleteness results – or from the cardinal
hierarchy). The only difference is of the historical kind: The concept of
counting was shaped in ancient Babylonian times and we can no longer tru-
ely imagine the transition from using different expressions for three oranges
and three stones to the abstract concept of the number 3. But it is not as-
tonishing at all if modern physics – e.g. quantum theory – does influence our
further understanding of mathematical concepts. To the contrary, the un-
reasonable effectiveness of mathematics should not – as Wigner has already
stressed – lead us to expect blindly that our concepts, shaped by experience
in the Savannah, should hold without any influence of further experience (as
e.g. gained in the quantum world).
In the following two sections, we will take a look at further evidence for the
relevance of quantum mechanics to the set theoretic foundations of mathe-
matics.
Remark: As is discussed in [Sus], on very long time scales – as they
take Alice to prepare a firewall at the black hole of Bob – the wormhole from
Alice to Bob – which allows Allice to send the firewall – opens up more and
more, finally becoming traversable. Now, use the ER = EPR hypothesis.
Then causal communication between the partners of the EPR pair should
become possible as the wormhole becomes traversable. In nonlocal hidden
variable formulations which are equivalent to usual quantum mechanics –
such as Bohmian mechanics – the consitency of EPR correlations with the
causality requirements of special relativity is assured precisely by the non-
locality, which puts the relation between the EPR partners purely on the
level of a correlation without any causal communication between them. It is
therefore natural to suspect that at the time causal communication between
the EPR partners becomes possible, a local hidden variable formulation be-
comes available for the situation. Indeed, this should precisely be provided
by the ER = EPR hypothesis. As long as the wormhole is nontraversable
this hypothesis states an equivalence between the two horizon conformal field
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theories at the two ends of the wormhole. But once the wormhole becomes
traversable and large enough, there is obviously a completely classical space-
time description available for the complete throat as a classical solution of
general relativity. We suspect that this classical gravity description is func-
tioning as a local hidden variable description for the EPR pair. But a local
hidden variable description is – as is well known from the famous theorem
of von Neumann – not allowed for by quantum mechanics. This should be
the way to see the inconsitency of the opening up of the wormhole from the
quantum mechanical side – i.e. the EPR side – while it is seen by the causal
problems traversable wormholes pose by allowing to be used as a time ma-
chine from the gravity – i.e. ER – side.
It is this view on the ER = EPR hypothesis which – if it could be established
by proof – would lend support to the idea that there might exist a reformu-
lation of the firewall paradox completely in terms of quantum mechanics
and classical thermodynamic observers, bringing it close to the setting of
Schro¨dinger’ Cat and Wigner’s Friend. On the other hand, in the setting
of [AW] traversable wormholes would precisely provide the closed time-like
curves which make the information provided by classical and quantum Turing
machines compatible. In this case, the availability of a local hidden variable
description – essentially providing a dual classical description for quantum
mechanics – should no longer cause a problem but it would come along with
the prize of a change in set theoretic foundations, e.g. by incorporating a
postulate like P = PSPACE.
For an overview to what extent set theory is not determined by e.g. usual
analysis and future axioms might be determined by external influence – in-
cluding a discussion on quantum mechanics and hidden variable theories –
see [Mag] (for a detailed example on hidden variables, see [FM]).
4 Chaitin incompletness
We have mentioned the difference, in information accessible at any time to a
classical versus a quantum system, repeatedly above. Randomness in quan-
tum mechanics exemplifies this point very clearly. In quantum mechanics we
encounter true randomness (as opposed to the output of a random algorithm)
and this seems to be essential for keeping quantum mechanics in line with
the causality requirements imposed by the special theory of relativity. It is
the true randomness in quantum mechanics which makes sure that for EPR
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correlated pairs of particles the information in the correlations is the only
information. If the randomenss in quantum mechanics would e.g. be of the
type of the output of a random algorithm there would be additional hidden
information – on the algorithm – in the individual outcomes which would
probably imply superluminal signaling between the partners of the pair.
Does the notion of randomness in quantum mechanics agree with the ran-
domness concept used in algorithmic information theory (see e.g. [Cha])?
The outcome of a quantum mechanical measurement should be random in
the sense that no quantum mechanical system can decode information from
it, i.e. no quantum computer should be able to compress the numbers (since
otherwise the outcome would not be random in a way compatible with the
principles of quantum mechanics itself). Since the notion of general com-
pressability agrees for quantum and classical Turing machines, this means
that the outcome should be random in the sense of algorithmic information
theory.
There is a formulation of Go¨del incompleteness in terms of complexity (see
[CC] and [Cha]; full equivalence to Go¨del incompleteness depends on a small
technical assunption on the axiom system S which we neglect, here): Let
S denote a formal axiomatic system (e.g. the ZFC system of set theory)
and K(x) the Kolmogorov entropy of a string x of symbols in the descrip-
tion language. Then we have the following theorem (Chaitin incompleteness
theorem):
There exists a constant L (which only depends on S) such that there does
not exist a string x for which the statement
K(x) ≥ L (5)
can be proven within the axiomatic system S.
This means that for binary numbers whose lenght exceeds L digits, we
can not prove their randomness in the axiomatic system S. But the random-
ness postulate of quantum mechanics requires randomness for measurement
outcomes, related to numbers of arbitrary length. This means that the ran-
domness postulate lives – as an example of Go¨del incompleteness – outside
the system ZFC. But more so, since any extension of ZFC to a more powerful
axiom system S would result in a similar number L(S) – which would again
be surpassed by the randomness postulate – we have to conclude that the
power of the randomness postulate of quantum mechanics is even beyond any
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finitely axiomatisable system S. The randomness postulate even claims the
randomness of measurement outcomes for any quantum mechanical system,
i.e. it involves a recourse to any (separable) Hilbert space and therefore a
recourse to an infinite family of transfinite structures. From the perspective
of axiomatic set theory it is therefore way beyond what is usually used and of
a strange circular character (with its back reference to transfinite structures).
In conclusion, the randomness postulate, together with the Chaitin version
of Go¨del incompleteness, gives another hint that quantum mechanics implies
a mathematical framework way beyond the ZFC system.
Let us close this section with a small side remark. Naively, one would ex-
pect the requirement of an agreement of classical and quantum computability
and imformation, resulting in the requirement P = PSPACE, as a stronger
requirement than the randomness postulate of quamtum mechanics since it
should result in usual quantum theory as a special limiting case. On the
other hand, (3) represents only one axiom while – as we have seen above –
the randomness postulate goes beyond any finitely axiomatizable system.
But this is not necessarily a contradiction since the question if we can view
a statement as one axiom (or e.g. infinitely many) depends on the lan-
guage/syntax underlying the formulation of the axiom system. So, this only
shows the possible scope of modifications (one has to consider all the blocks
of logical and set theoretic axioms as a whole, as we have noted above) im-
posed by the requirement of (3).
There might be a different perspective possible. As discussed above, it might
be possible to see wormholes as providing – through ER = EPR – a local
hidden variable description. If this would be true, it could mean that in
the setting of a theory with P = PSPACE the randomness postulate of
quantum mechanics might not be needed any more (since there would exist
a dual hidden variable description). This would make a postulate like (3)
even more interesting since it seems to be much more managable – than the
randomness postulate – from a set theoretic perspective (and much closer
to postulates set theorists can provide experience with and, hence, give new
technical input to the mathematical physics side).
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5 The model theoretic results of Benioff
Indeed, a completely rigorous and detailed mathematical analysis of the re-
lationship of quantum mechanics to the foundations of mathematics – in
the form of set theory – exists (see [Ben1976a], [Ben1976b]). What Benioff
showed is that formulating randomness in quantum mechanics in precise set
theoretical terms and requiring a strong enough randomness notion to be sat-
isfied, it is not possible to formulate quantum mechanics in a minimal model
of ZFC (or also certain types of extensions of minimal models, as shown in
the second paper). One might justifiably claim that these models are very
strange (and very restrictive) models, far away from the standard models of
ZFC. But the essential point is that the results of Benioff show that quantum
mechanics does definitely not work in all models of ZFC. But this is silently
assumed if we view ZFC as the foundational basis of mathematics and math-
ematical physics since we assume in this way that we could in principle at
any time reduce all our proofs to manipulations of the axioms of ZFC alone
(even if we never do this in practice and have never done it for most of our
arguments). If only one model is excluded as a home for quantum mechanics
this means that this is not true and that quantum mechanics is living beyond
the axiomatic scope of ZFC.
In a first step one could be tempted not to view this as a serious problem, tak-
ing the standpoint that it just means we have to use some form of extension of
ZFC to give a proper formulation of quantum mechanics or, alternatively, ac-
cept the intrusion of some pieces of model theory into mathematical physics.
But the adaptation of model theory means that silently we assume a meta
level to be attached to our theory, the level on which the sets live we build
our models from. We say silently because usually it is not necessary to deal
with this level with heavy machinery because for most cases a very moderate
level of properties of these meta level sets is used (often referred to as naive
set theory, for this reason). But wanting to formulate quantum mechanics
properly, the situation is very different. At the meta level we talk about the
axiomatic set theory and about quantum mechanics founded in it. But for
quantum mechanics this means the meta level is the level of the observer,
making use of quantum mechanics and quantum experiments. But – as in
the case of experiments – suppose we decide to pass to a quantum mechan-
ical description of the observer himself (for the prize of introducing another
second level observer). This means that we can no longer treat the meta level
with naive set theory because – as the results of Benioff show – there will
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arise situations which are intricate enough not to work in all models of ZFC.
In other words, we are not only forced to introduce the full fledged machin-
ery of ZFC but also model theory on the meta level. The latter implies that
we need a meta meta level on which to build the models for the meta level
from a naive set theory. But now we can iterate the argument, passing to
a quantum mechanical description on the meta meta level. In consequence,
we are driven into an infinite hierarchy of model theories which once again
shows that the randomness postulate of quantum mechanics leads us beyond
any finitely axiomatizable system.
As a side remark, let us note that the results of [Nab] show that for
any finitely axiomatizable extension of ZFC – to be used as foundations for
mathematics and mathematical physics – there remains an indeterminacy of
the partition function of Euclidean quantum gravity which is due to Go¨del
incompleteness.
Let us close this section by two additional remarks:
• Dealing with model theory, incompleteness, etc., at the meta level, it
is natural to pose the question if there is a relation to the hierarchy of
super Ωs of Chaitin. If this could be shown to be the case, it would again
show the vastness of modifications in the foundations of mathematics,
required by quantum mechanics.
• Observe that the meta level is precisely the level at which Wigner’s
Friend lives, leading – in a conventional classical versus quantum de-
scription – to the incompatibility of recurrence times, above.
6 Conclusion
Suppose paradoxes in physics (like Schro¨dinger’s Cat, Wigner’s Friend, or
the Firewall Paradox) would force us to adopt an axiom like P = PSPACE
(as we have pointed out, the situation is – in principle – not different for the
P 6= NP case). We collect a few implications this could or would have.
• Physics – once again – would be at the point of requiring new mathe-
matics, but this time far beyond the invention of calculus by Newton
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to have the machinery for the formulation of classical mechanics. Sim-
ilar situations have occured in history. Simple rules of geometry, as
e.g. the law of Pythagoras, have been known to Babylonean geometers
as heuristic rules but required a thorough foundation of these rules as
laws to develop geometry as a mathematical discipline. Indeed, this
transition involved the invention of much of the foundational features
of mathematics, including the concept of mathematical proof. Another
example from history is the concept of number. It is difficult to truely
inagine for us today the transition (which took place in Babylonian
times) from concrete numbers – three oranges or three stones – to the
abstract concept of 3. But once this was a change in foundational con-
cepts. The concept of number is still very much behind the way we
form the concepts for the transfinite world, as most explicitely seen in
the concept of cardinality. Finite sets – numbers in disguise – are the
prototype we have in mind, when trying to keep some of their prop-
erties by invoking appropriate axioms for transfinite sets. This shows
very clearly how much our perception of transfinite concepts is shaped
by very early experience of human kind in the everyday world. As we
have stressed above, there is no reason to expect that our modern epe-
rience with e.g. the quantum world should not influence the way we
think about abstract transfinite concepts. Indeed, we invent transfinite
concepts as a means to transport our abililty to analytically under-
stand the world way beyond our everyday experience. We should not
be surprised if we meet obstacles on this route which form our further
perception of the transfinte world by new external input.
• With postulates like P = PSPACE (or P 6= NP ) an approach to the
foundations of mathematics, influenced by concepts from quantum me-
chanics, would no longer remain an elsusive subject. Approaches based
on quantum logic (trying to introduce a from of quantum set theory)
have always suffered from the same problem which we have encountered
above for model theory. They need a meta level which either remains
classical or leaves us with an unmanageable infinite hierarchy of theo-
ries. In contrast, the above postulates are completely in line with the
way set theorists approach the transfinite world beyond ZFC (as ex-
amples, take Kunen inconsistency or IST – both mentioned above – or
non-well founded sets). Also, complexity theory – with the hierarchy
of complexity classes – is a well developed mathematical subject with
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established foundational contact.
• Finally, introducing an axiom like P = PSPACE for the description
of the transfinite world, could have profound implications for our un-
derstanding of complexity in general. There are processes like protein
folding which seem to be far beyond the computational complexity
accessible by a quantum computer, i.e. it is completey unclear how
nature manages to complete these processes on any reasonable time
scale (see [DD]). A list of such examples could be continued, including
e.g. topics from material science. Mathematical foundations based e.g.
on (3) could therefore lead to the development of the appropriate cal-
culational tools for these processes. In this way, they could even have
huge economical impact. The availability of the calculational tools of
calculus was of tremendous importance for the development of steam
engines and the subsequent quest for higher efficiency – leading finally
to the internal combustion engine – the development of railway lines,
etc. in the 18th and 19th century. The basic concept of a steam engine
was already known in Greek antiquity but it was probably very much
the availability of the appropriate calculational tools which decided be-
tween having an amusimg spectacle for puppet theatres or an industrial
revolution.
A A physics perspective
The Firewall Paradox has the character of a causal paradox. The decoding
of the Hawking radiation by Alice makes Information available to infalling
Bob which should not yet be available to him. To a considerable extent,
general relativity has the character of a thermodynamic theory, with e.g.
concepts like entropy, enthalpy, and temperature all playing their role in
black hole physics. In the example of Schro¨dinger’s Cat (and the paradox of
Wigner’s Friend, building on it) we have – in the view presented above – a
purely thermodynamic decoding problem giving rise to the paradox. Could
it be that the Firewall paradox helps to translate – by making use of the
fact that space-time in general relativity plays a double role with many con-
cepts allowing for a thermodynamic, as well, as a causal space-time view –
a clash between quantum mechanics and a classical thermodynamic world of
observers – as exemplified by Schro¨dinger’ Cat and Wigner’s Friend – into
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a causal paradox? We have discussed above that this clash between quan-
tum mechanics and classical thermodynamic observers appears largely to be
rooted in a difference of information available at a given time. In the firewall
paradox it is also information which should classically not yet be available
to Bob which causes the paradox.
Normally, the thermodynamic character of a theory means that it is not
quantized at all but is taken to signal the existence of a microscopic theory
behind it and it is only the microscopic theory which gives proper rise to the
quantum description. In the case of general relativity, this is precisely the
perspective which string theory provides. What is not clear is if such a per-
spective also works beyond phenomena which can be approached with local
experiments. In general relativity, the Planck scale provides a limt of what
can be investigated with local experiments. But as shown in [Sus], the far
ultra-Planckian regime and length scales far below the Planck length might
well have physical meaning, albeit not in the sense of information provided
by local experiments but through observation on very long time scales. In the
view presented in [Sus], the Planck scale is merely a complexity bound and
the very high degrees of complexity of the ultra-Planckian regime can only
be investigated on very long time scales (since they are in non polynomial
complexity classes with a quantum computation taking a very long time).
For these high complexity phenomena beyond the Planck scale it is not a
priori clear if we can conclude the existence of a microscopic theory – giving
in turn rise to a proper quantized description – from the thermodynamic
character of general relativity.
Is it conceivable that string theory could play the role of a realization of
a computability requirement for degrees of freedom below the Planck scale
(and, hence, in the polynomial complexity class)? Following the view on
the Planck scale as a complexity bound, the degrees of freedom observed
below this bound are precisely those which can be accessed by a quantum
computer in short – i.e. polynomial – time. This is the reason why they
are accessible by (space-time) local – in contrast to long time – experiments.
With length scales far below the Planck length (i.e. degrees of freedom far
above the Planck scale, understood as an energy scale) still having a physical
meaning in general relativity (see [Sus]), this means that general relativity
should inherently endow the degrees of freedom at length scales above the
Planck length with a structure which makes them accessible to quantum
computation. Could string theory be viewed as providing a realization of
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this quantum computability requirement?
In this view, the quantum computability requirement would be the abstract
concept and string theory (one) concrete realization, i.e. the relationship
of an abstract complexity hierarchy/quantum computing based approach to
string theory would be roughly reminding of the relationship of abstract
Hilbert space quantum mechanics to the concrete realization in wave me-
chanics. It is interesting to note in this respect that the Leech lattice –
which is used to obtain the compactification torus for bosonic string the-
ory, leading to the monster vertex algebra – has a deep connection to the
Golay error correcting code (which was used e.g. by NASA in the Voyager
missions).
Viewing ultra-Planckian degrees of freedom in general relativity as non-
accessible by quantum computation (in polynomial time) would mean that
for these degrees of freedom we can not resolve the thermodynamic charac-
ter of the theory by an introduction of micro states which then give rise to
a proper quantized theory. The quantum micro states would simply be non
accessible by quantum computation, i.e. non accessible as proper quantum
mechanical systems. But if the thermodynamic character of general relativ-
ity can not be resolved in this way for all degrees of freedom, the question
of making general relativity compatible with quantum mechanics acquires a
new degree of urgency because it is normally not possible to quantize a ther-
modynamic theory at face value. This – and the possible physical meaning
of length scales in general relativity far below the Planck length in long time
observations – brings us back to the old question if general relativity should
be quantized at all.
The most convincing argument that it definitely has to be dates back to
Feynman, using the following argument: Suppose we consider the usual dou-
ble slit experiment for electrons. The usual argument why we can not simply
check which of the two slits the electron passed through while retaining the
interference pattern at the same time, relies on the quantization of electro-
magnetic radiation. Using a photon send to the double slit to measure the
position of the electron, we have to use a sufficiently short wave length to
allow – by the usual rules of optics – for a resolution below the dimensions
of the double slit. But since the elctromagnetic radiation is quantized we
can not decrease the intensity below the one photon level, leaving us with a
minimum of energy and momentum of the radiation. The subsequent mo-
mentum transfer to the electron in the course of measurement leads to the
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well known uncertainty in the electron momentum, consequently destroying
the interference pattern. If gravity would not be quantized, we could simply
use gravitational waves instead of electromagnetic radiation for the position
measurement of the electron at the double slit. Since the gravitational waves
would not be quantized, we would be free to decrease the intensity of the
beam arbitrarily. Hence, we would not disturb the momentum of the elec-
tron leaving us with an interference pattern while knowing the position of
the electron – to arbitrary accuracy – at the same time. The important
point is that this double slit experiment is not some quantum gravitational
version of a double slit. It is a usual double slit experiment with electrons.
The conclusion is that a non quantized theory of gravity would destroy the
consitency of quantum mechanics even in those cases in which it is very well
experimentally established.
But the argument of Feynman applies in an obvious way only to degrees of
freedon which can be accessed by local experiments (like measuring a pre-
cise position at a given time). The compatibility of these degrees of freedom
with quantum mechanics would be assured if general relativity satisfies a
quantum computabilty requirement for these degrees, as suggested above.
This leaves us with only one a priori argument that general relativity as a
whole – including the ultra-Planckian regime – has to be quantized: The
incompatibility of the information content at a given time between classical
and quantum theories is deeply involved in all of the paradoxes discussed
above, i.e. Schro¨dinger’s Cat, Wigner’s Friend, and the Firewall Paradox.
But this incompatibility is resolved in a setting as in [AW] (giving rice to
P = PSPACE) with general relativity and quantum mechanics providing
the same information content – in the sense of the same computational ac-
cessability – at any time. In such a setting there appears to be no obvious
argument in favour of a quantization of general relativity.
Returning to a more mathematical viewpoint, in a foundational change in
mathematics, including (3), the issue of the conflict between general relativity
and quantum mechanics would be resolved by placing both theories into
a foundational set theory framework which ensures the consitency of their
information content. Thus general relativity would not need to be quantized
in the conventional sense. Placing it into a different foundational framework
would be akin – though different in important respects – to the way synthetic
geometry is introduced as differential geometry inside a topos.
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Chris Isham has for several decades stressed the fact that it is not obvious
at which level of the mathematical concept of manifold structure the transit
to making general relativity compatible with quantum mechanics has to take
place. Canonical approaches take the metric as the relevant structure, leaving
the differential and topological structure of the manifold fixed. More general
approaches try to sum also over topologies and (exotic) differential structures.
Still, even these approaches leave the underlying set theoretic structure as
given. As Isham has stressed, the underlying point set structure has the
well known physical meaning of events. In special and general relativity we
normally do not think of events as an a priori given structure but as defined
only by physical processes (e.g. as the intersection of two world-lines). Hence,
it is not obvious that it might not be the level of set theory which requires
modification in order to achieve consitency of general relativity with quantum
mechanics. What we have suggested above is that the Firewall Paradox might
point very concretely into this direction.
Finally, let us collect a few additional reamarks:
• One might pose the question why compatibility of the information –
available at any time – of classical and quantum systems, as shown
for the setting of [AW], should necessarily lead to a change in the set
theoretic foundations of mathematics and mathematical physics. After
all, the analysis of [AW] is completely done in the conventional frame-
work of ZFC and the compatibilty results completely from the physical
phenomenon of closed timelike curves. In spite of this, the analysis
in [AW] does imply that classical and quantum Turing machines in
this setting can handle problems in the complexity class PSPACE in
polynomial time. As for passing from classical to quantum Turing ma-
chines, we have a different concept of (classical and quantum) Turing
machine in the setting of [AW]. For these Turing machines problems
in the complexity class PSPACE are polynomial, i.e. viewed inter-
nally from a set theory – or indeed any other form of axiomatic theory
– which is compatible with these Turing machines (i.e. proofs in the
axiom system of this set theory can be seen as programs running on
such a Turing machine, just the same way this is true for proofs in ZFC
and conventional Turing machines) the postulate P = PSPACE has
to hold. We do not think of such foundational changes of set theory on
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passing from (usual) classical to (usual) quantum Turing machines for
the simple reason that in this case the speed up achieved by quantum
computers for certain problems does not seem to seriuosly interfer with
the hierachy of complexity classes. In contrast, (3) is by most experts
in the field believed to be contradicted by ZFC. We can heuristically
use an approach in the conventional setting of ZFC – as in [AW] – as a
fist step but ultimately the Turing machines which the theory describes
and those which the experimental scientist (or the mathematician who
constructs the theory, like the external observer an experiment) uses,
should agree. Even if one does not believe in a full fledged requirement
of the Church-Turing thesis, one can not accept the two concepts of
Turing machines to result in contradicting axioms. Turing machines
are not different in this respect from clocks, as used in the famous
thought experiments founding special and general relativity by Ein-
stein. The Turing machines which the theory internally describes give
the predictions of what the theory supposes an observer to measure
on a Turing machine and in checking these predictions experimentally
on a Turing machine we have to suppose that the two concepts funda-
mentally agree and are definitely not in mutual contradiction to each
other.
• While the passage from (usual) classical to (usual) quantum computers
does not seem to seriuosly affect the complexity hierarchy (not to the
degree leading to obvious candidates for contradiction to the ZFC ax-
iom system), it leaves the concept of proofabilty completely unchanged.
In other words, while there is a speed up for certain problems on quan-
tum computers, the halting problem is not affected at all. A program
running on a (usual) quantum computer does halt if and only if it does
on a (usual) classical Turing machine and if we can prove this on one
of the machines we can always on the other. This is not true even in
passing to classical general relativity (without anything like Hawking
radiation involved). As is well known, the class of Malament-Hogarth
space-times (to which e.g. the internal part of the Kerr solution be-
longs) does not respect the halting problem, i.e. an observer in these
space-times may be able to observe if a Turing machine does halt or
not, even if this is impossible to decide in ZFC (e.g. he might be able
to decide about the consistency of the axiom system ZFC itself, in this
way; see [Ear] for a general account on Malament-Hogarth space-times
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and [EM] for the first detailed and conclusive study of the Kerr solu-
tion).
The scenario of [AW] – with polynomial computing time for the com-
plexity class PSPACE (for both, classical and quantum computers) –
puts space and time resources in computing on an equal footing. This
alone is a sign of a certain naturality of such Turing machines in a rela-
tivistic setting. As we have mentioned above, the central ingredient in
[AW], leading to the compatibility of classical and quantum computing
power, is the presence of closed time-like curves. The polynomial time
accessability of the complexity class PSPACE is a consequence. A
priori it is therefore not clear if the postulate P = PSPACE for a
foundational change in set theory is sufficient (If not, one would have
to search for a more general change of axioms, including or implying
P = PSPACE. Since this would not change the general character of
the approach discussed above, we have decided to restrict completely
to the simplest possibility that this postulate alone might be sufficient.
In any case, it would provide a natural starting point to discuss founda-
tional changes.). The naturalness of an equivalence of space and time
resources in computing in a relativistic setting is a concrete argument
in favour of precisely the postulate (3).
If a change in foundations, based on (3), is sufficient to include also the
increased power with respect to proofability, which Turing machines in
Malament-Hogarth space-times show, is an open question for research.
Presently it seems that Malament-Hogarth space-times naturally fit
into the scenario of [AW] since known examples show the appearance
of closed time-like curves – as is e.g. well known from the interior of the
Kerr solution – and this seems to be a generic feature but no general
theorem, establishing this, is known so far (see [Ear]).
Closed time-like curves are always viewed with some suspicion in physics,
even if a consitency condition is used. But even in the most general case
– without a consistency condition invoked – we must confess that – once
we take into account the possibility of a change on the foundational set
theory level – it is not clear if their paradoxical character is inherent or
arises from using inappropriate foundations. To avoid misunderstand-
ing: We do not imply here that any form of foundational change would
not have to respect consitency but what we think of is that placing the
geonetry of general relativity into a different foundational framework
could avoid the appearance of paradoxes. To give a concrete example:
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Different outcomes for 2pi and 4pi rotations are paradoxical from the
viewpoint of classical geometry. But they are not for spin-1
2
systems
in quantum mechanics, simply because geometrically we pass to the
group SU(2), thereby killing the first nontrivial homotopy group of the
rotation group SO(3), in this way resolving the paradox. Note that
interestingly there is a connection to gravity if one pursues this ap-
proach furhter in higher dimensions: Killing the next higher nontrivial
homotopy group of SO(n) leads one to the string group which is be-
hind Green-Schwarz anomaly cancellation and the story goes on in the
next steps, again, with fivebrane anomaly cancellation (relating to the
dominating degree of freedom in M-theory, if one counts the number
of central charges in the 11-dimensional supersymmetry algebra) and
ninebrane anomaly cancellation (relating to boundary conditions, re-
spectively domain walls, in M-theory and space-filling branes in string
theory) appearing(see [SSS] and [Sat]). What we suggest, here, is that
something similar might happen not only for classical homotopy groups,
i.e. closed loops in classical geomtery, but also relativistically for closed
time-like curves.
• The relation of a foundational approach to [HH]: Let us close with a –
we think important – remark. As we have stressed above, the situation
in the approach of [HH] is not really different from one using e.g. (3)
for a change in the underlying set theoretic foundations. The approach
of [HH] requires P 6= NP , in order work. While one would certainly
weigh the odds differently – as compared to a postulate like (3) – for
this to be simply derivable in ZFC, at present we simply do not know
this. In other words, basing an approach in mathematical physics on
[HH], we have to be prepared to accept that it could force us into ac-
cepting a change in foundations (and for the very same reasons we have
expelled for the case of (3), there is no reason why we should not see
this as a natural development of our view on the world of transfinite
concepts). But beyond this, though an approach based on (3) appears
as an alternative path to [HH], we think that to a certain extend it
relies on the approach of [HH] to work in a first step. The situation
is very much the same as we have discussed it above for [AW]. We
presently arrive on any of our conclusions about the firewall paradox
based on an approach which is founded in ZFC. This only can work if it
is not outright inconsistent from the start. This should mean that for
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situations were we can for the first steps start working with the usual
classical and quantum Turing machine concepts – as opposed to the
more involved machines of [AW] – there should be something like the
complexity hierarchy based scenario of [HH] shielding us from outright
inconsistency from the start.
The situation might be even more extreme if the firewall paradox could
be given a formulation purely in terms of quantum mechanics and clas-
sical thermodynamic observers. The way it stands, the firewall paradox
establishes a clash between quantum mechanics and general relativity,
i..e it shows that we have two theories for which it is inconsistent to
apply them jointly to the same class of phenomena, even in weak grav-
itational fields. Suppose, one could give a purely quantum mechanical
formulation. Suppose, as the most extreme case, this could be done
along the lines of [Ben1976a] and [Ben1976b], bringing back the prob-
lem of accessible information – lying at the root of the firewall paradox
– to accessible information under the quantum randomness postulate.
Hilbert space quantum mechanics alone can be seen to a large degree
as a purely axiomatic mathematical discipline. So, a paradox in this
setting would come very close to an inconsitency of ZFC. But we know
from experience that starting mathematics and mathematical physics
from ZFC is – at the very least – an extremely successful first step.
We could not derive anything sensible about quantum mechanics – and
possible implications it might have for foundational isssues – if this
would not hold for a very large degree. So, if this would happen (to
just take the most extreme example for illustration) there would still
have to be some mechanism shielding ZFC from outright inconsistency.
The use of the complexity hierarchy in the approach of [HH] and [Sus]
might provide such a mechanism. In the most extreme case, ZFC could
be effectively consistent in the way David Ruelle once coined this term.
A proof of inconsistency from within the axiom system ZFC could just
take too long – in its most compressed form in terms of complexity the-
ory – to be established in cosmological time scales experienced so far
in the universe (in this case, our experience from the Savannah would
carrry us a long way but not into a Platonic transfinite world). So, for
problems of low enough complexity it would be justified to deal with
the usual concept of Turing machine but beyond a certain complexity
scale we would be forced into accepting a different concept of Turing
machine and, hence, a different foundational framework.
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Even if we do not consider the case of mathematical inconsitency, a
mechanism resembling the effective consitency of Ruelle might be rele-
vant. It could just take a very long time – in the sense of computational
complexity – to establish P 6= NP in ZFC even if it would hold, there.
The same could be true for disproving P = PSPACE. In this way, us-
ing ZFC as a staring point of our considerations might be compatible
even if we would ultimately need a different foundational framework.
We always need a form of upward compatibilty in physics if we pass to
a new and more general framework (e.g. in passing from classical me-
chanics to special and general relativity or to quantum mechanics) and
this would also have to hold true if we would have to change founda-
tions. The approach of [HH] and [Sus] could ensure this if it would be
applicable to this effective consitency like scenario. This would mean
that it would not only be applicable to computing times but also to
proof length for some special questions (like e.g. P 6= NP ), i.e. for
these questions the complexity considerations of this approach would
also apply to complexity of proofs itself.
B A final mathematical remark
As we have mentioned above, ultimately Turing machines used internally in
the description of a theory (like those in [AW]) and Turing machines used
by an observer (or the mathematician formulating the theory) have to agree
because the internal concept tells us what the theory expects the observer
to measure on his Turing machine (just as in the discussion of clocks in rel-
ativity). This even holds true if internal Turing machines differ in terms of
proofability (as in the case of Malament-Hogarth space-times). Everything
else can only be a first approximation. We have discussed above how it might
be possible that such a first approximation works at all. This was based on a
kind of effective compatibility of the two foundational theories, much of the
type of the effective consistency suggested by Ruelle. Such effective proper-
ties of theories are close to the way the theoretical physicist thinks about the
relation of his theories to each other (e.g. the concept of effective quantum
field theory).
There might be a more mathematical way to think about this situation: Dis-
cussing e.g. Turing machines in general relativity (as in [AW] or in the case of
Malament-Hogarth space-times) silently assumes that we can apply general
27
relativity also on the meta level on which – as we have discussed above in the
case of model theory – normally naive set theory resides. One might argue
that the meta level is not truely involved since set theory allows to transform
this situation back to a description purely within set theory. Though such an
argument might be applied if we discuss only speed ups of Turing machines
(as e.g. in the case of quantum computers), it does not seem to be applicable
if the internal Turing machines differ in terms of proofability from what we
can achive in ZFC (because then – by definition – we could never reproduce
their proofs in ZFC). In this case, we truely assume the applicability of gen-
eral relativity on the meta level.
Mathematically, a sufficient condition to achieve this is the full applicabil-
ity of ZFC on the meta level (instead of naive set theory). From a set
theoretic viewpoint this gives approaches to Turing machines in Malament-
Hogarth space-times the flavor of forcing. It is no contradiction that the
internal theories might differ from ZFC. This means that we can not repro-
duce this situation in set forcing since in this case the new model, resulting
from forcing, will again satisfy the ZFC axioms. If a technique similar to
forcing is applicable to these cases, one would – at least – need class forc-
ing where the new model need no longer be one of ZFC. If forcing would
be applicable, it would mean that the needs of physicists in approaches like
Malament-Hogarth space-times or [AW] could be satisfied within a highly
developed framework – even if more exotic forcing techniques beyond class
forcing would turn out to be needed – and that set theorists would be able
to offer the technical expertise for a new tool in mathematical physics.
How would the effective theory viewpoint fit into a picture based on forcing
(assuming that the latter would be applicable, here)? For the sake of easy
illustration let us restrict to the most radical case, here, the effective con-
sistency of Ruelle. Normally, one would take the view that forcing relies on
assuming the consitency of ZFC since one constructs the exotic models from
a model of ZFC. But consider the following speculative situation: Suppose
we would establish inconsistency of ZFC. We would surely go on to isolate
those ZFC axioms responsible for the contradiction. Suppose this is axiom
A. Suppose additionally – not logically important in the sequel – that we
would have reason (e.g. from physics) to view the contradiction as natural.
Suppose further that we would have constructed by forcing a model contra-
dicting A (using ¬A, as most experts would suspect to be the case for a
model with P = PSPACE). Since the model anyway uses ¬A, intuitively
we would have no reason to suspect that it is also inconsistent (in spite of
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being constructed from a ZFC model). This would be even more convinc-
ing – though, again, logically not necessary – if we would have reason from
physics (as e.g. in the case of P = PSPACE) to construct this model for a
more advanced theory, i.e. if we would view this model from a physics based
perspective as the superior one, anyway.
Forcing (class forcing and more general forcing notions) should in this way
naturally include a mathematical version of effective consistency (as formu-
lated by Ruelle on a physics/cosmology basis). If e.g. the forcing construction
of the new model itself – not involved arguments within it – does not exceed
proof length L and we could show that a proof of inconsistency of ZFC needs
proof length ≫ L, we would have a version of effective consistency.
Finally, we should stress that much of our discussion on a possible inter-
action of physics to foundational questions in set theory, here, is not limited
to the special case of theories with P = PSPACE (we have repeatedly men-
tioned above that the situation with an approach as followed in [HH] and
[Sus] is – concerning the necessary P 6= NP requirement – not really dif-
ferent, in principle) and even not to the firewall paradox. When discussing
Turing machines in Malament-Hogarth space-times – a setting which is from
the physics side placed completely in the well established theory of general
relativity – physicists have silently assumed the applicability of general rel-
ativity on the meta level, i.e. they have defintitely left the framework of
ZFC proper. It is in any case an interesting question – for both physics and
set theory – how to put this onto a mathematical basis which is rigorous
also from the high standards of axiomatic set theory. Questions, like the
applicability of a framework like (class or more exotic) forcing for this, arise
naturally, here.
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